There is now an incredible wealth of data about individuals, businesses and organizations. This data is freely available over the Internet to almost anyone willing to pay for it, independently of whether they are identity thieves or credit card scam artists or legitimate users. This has led to a growing need for privacy. In this paper, we first present a simple logical model of privacy. We then show that the problem of privacy may be reduced to that of brave reasoning in default logic theories, thus reducing this important problem to a well understood reasoning paradigm. By leveraging this reduction, we are able to develop efficient privacy preservation algorithms
Introduction
The privacy of individuals is under attack as never before. In the wake of recent terrorist events, various government agencies worldwide are seeking to acquire all kinds of private information about individuals in an effort to preserve national security. Another area where potential privacy disasters loom is in the area of medical data -many hospitals post some seemingly innocuous data on web sites (e.g. about births) but it is often possible to infer private health information about individuals. A third need for privacy mechanisms is because of poor access control and network security mechanisms that may allow outsiders to get into supposedly secure networks. In this case, there is a need to maintain privacy of data even from insiders (both genuine insiders and hackers).
Most databases have abysmal privacy mechanisms -these mechanisms by and large boil down to saying certain columns of the database are hidden from certain types of users. However, the reality of life is that many users can infer information designated private by asking queries that do not involve private information and then making common sense inferences from the answers to infer private information.
Research on privacy is now rapidly increasing because of the counterterrorism initiatives as well as because of the increasing availability of financial and health data on the web.
The primary goal of this paper is to show that there is a close connection between the problem of providing privacy preserving answers to queries and the problem of computing extensions of certain kinds of default theories. In particular, we define a linear time and linear space transformation trans of the privacy preservation problem to the problem of computing extensions of default logic theories. We prove that there is a one one correspondence between privacy preserving answers and the extensions of the default logic theory (restricted to the query) obtained by translating the privacy preservation problem into default logic via trans. Leveraging this translation, we are able to derive a suite of results on the complexity of maintaining privacy. Finally, we present an algorithm to check for privacy.
The Privacy Preservation Problem
In this section, we provide a simple formulation of the privacy preservation problem (P3 for short).
We start by assuming the existence of some finite set U of users. Each member of U is a string denoting a userid.
We assume the existence of some finite set of constant symbols, function symbols and predicate symbols. As usual, a term is inductively defined as follows: (i) Each constant is a term, (ii) Each variable is a term, and (iii) if f is an n-ary predicate symbol and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, then f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is a term. A ground term is any term that contains no variable symbols. Similarly, if p is an n-ary predicate symbol and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, then p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an atom. A ground atom is any atom that contains no variable symbols. A well formed formula (wff) is inductively defined as follows. (i) Every atom is a wff, (ii) If F, G are wffs then so are (F ∧ G), (F ∨ G) and ¬F . We use WFF to denote the set of all well formed formulas in our language.
Definition 1 (logic database) A logic database LDB is a finite set of ground atoms.
Note that any standard relational database can be viewed as a logic database -if tuple t is a tuple in a relation r, then r( t) is a ground atom. This little database, which we will call MedDB will be used as a motivating example in this paper.
The database may contain information about various individuals, businesses and organizations. These entities may wish to designate some (or all) of this information as private. For example, John and Jane may want their diseases kept private.
In addition, at any given instance t in time, each user u has some set of background knowledge. This background knowledge may be elicited in many ways -one such source is the set of all information disclosed to the user by the system. For example, a hospital accountant may not be allowed to see patient diagnoses, though he may see billing information about them.
Definition 2 (user model) We assume the existence of a family of functions BK t : U → 2 WFF for each t in time, and a function Priv : U → 2 WFF .
As usual, 2 X is used here to denote the power set of some set X. Intuitively, BK t (u) denotes the background knowledge of user u (which we assume to be consistent) at time t, while Priv(u) is the set of all formulas that the user wants to keep secret. Note that BK t (u) varies as t varies. For example, as the database discloses answers to the user u, his background knowledge may increase. Throughout the rest of this paper, we will assume that t is arbitrary but fixed and we address the problem of preserving privacy at time t. As a consequence, we will usually write BK(u) and drop the superscript t. Technical Report Example 3 Returning to our MedDB example, the answer to the query disease(john, X) is the set {disease(john, aids)}. Likewise, the answer to the query symptom(john, X) is the set {symptom(john, s 1 ), symptom(john, s 2 ), symptom(john, s 3 )}.
In our example, we considered the case when John and Jane want their diseases kept private. However, the accountant can violate John's privacy by asking the query symptom(john, X). The answer she would get back is {symptom(john, s 1 ), symptom(john, s 2 ), symptom(john, s 3 )}. However, recall that the accountant has some background information -this background information includes the rule symptom(X, s 2 ) & symptom(X, s 3 ) → disease(X, cancer). Using this rule and the answer to her query above, the accountant can easily infer that John has cancer. The notion of a privacy preserving answer given below is intended to avoid such situations.
Definition 5 (privacy preserving answer) Suppose LDB is a logic database, U is a set of users, u 0 ∈ U , and suppose the functions BK and Priv are specified. Suppose Q is a query. A set X ⊆ WFF is a privacy preserving answer w.r.t.
3. There is no X such that X ⊂ X satisfies the previous two conditions.
Intuitively, a privacy preserving answer to a query posed by user u 0 is a subset of the actual answer to the query that does not allow him to use his background knowledge to infer any new private information about any other user. Note that when user u 0 poses a query, we are only interested in preserving private information about other users uclearly, the user u 0 can know private information about himself, as he, presumably, is the one who decides what information about him is to be kept private.
Example 4 Let us return to the MedDB example, and consider the case of the obnoxious accountant. If the system knows that she has the background knowledge listed earlier, when she asks the query symptom(john, X), then it could return either of the following privacy preserving answers.
Ans1 = {symptom(john, s 1 ), symptom(john, s 2 )} Ans2 = {symptom(john, s 1 ), symptom(john, s 3 )}
Either of these two answers returns as much of the real answer as possible without making it possible for the user to infer that John has cancer.
Let us suppose that the above query was asked at time t. In this case, the accountant's background knowledge at time t+1 should be updated so that it includes all his previous background knowledge, plus the additional knowledge that John has symptoms s 1 and s 3 . Thus, BK t (acct) = BK t+1 (acct) ∪ {symptom(john, s 1 ), symptom(john, s 2 )} (assuming the answer returned by the system in response to John's query at time t is Ans1 above. For the sake of simplicity, throughout the rest of this paper, we assume that t is arbitrary but fixed, and that we are only interested in preserving privacy at time t. We emphasize that the above definition allows the background knowledge to contain some private information. A simpler definition would be to drop the "if BK(u 0 ) |= p then" part in (2) above. But then there would be no privacy preserving answers at all if BK(u 0 ) contained some private information. We are now ready to state the Privacy Preservation Problem (P3).
Problem 1 (P3(LDB, U , BK, Priv, u 0 , Q)) Suppose LDB is a logic database, U is a finite set of users, BK is a background knowledge function, Priv is a privacy function, u 0 is a user in U who is posing query Q to the logic database LDB. The privacy preservation problem is to find a privacy-preserving answer w.r.t. (LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , Q).
The following proposition says that there is always a privacy preserving answer.
Proposition 1 Every privacy preservation problem P3(LDB, U , BK, Priv, u 0 , Q) has at least one privacy preservation answer.
A database system that seeks to preserve privacy can use the following algorithm to answer queries posed by user u 0 .
algorithm PrivAns(P3(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , Q)) 1. Find a privacy preserving answer Ans to query Q w.r.t.
3. Return Ans to user u 0 and halt.
The key step in this algorithm is step (1). The rest of this paper develops methods to implement step (1).
Translating the PP Problem to Default Logic
In this section, we provide a translation trans which takes as input, a privacy preservation problem P3(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , Q), and returns as output, a default logic theory ∆ = (D, W ) such that there is a one one correspondence between the solutions to the privacy preservation problem and the extensions of the default theory (restricted to the query) returned by the translation [Cadoli et al., 1997] . The consequence of this translation is that standard (and well studied) methods to evaluate default logic theories may be used to preserve privacy effectively, efficiently, and elegantly. 
and BK(u 0 ) |= p}.
We now present an example to show what the result of transforming the privacy preservation problem into default logic looks like. Note that this translation uses linear space. The time complexity of the translation depends on the complexity of checking entailment. For example, assuming a finite number of constants in our language (reasonable) and assuming that all rules in BK are definite clauses, then the translation is implementable in polynomial time. But if BK can consist of arbitrary first order formulas, then the translation can take exponential time.
Before presenting our central theorem linking privacy preserving answers and extensions of default theories, we remind the reader of some basic terminology associated with default theories. Given a default d = We are now ready to present a key result linking the privacy preservation problem and default logic extensions. Suppose we consider any privacy preservation problem. The privacy preserving answers to that privacy preservation problem are in a one-one correspondence with the consistent extensions of the translation (restricted to the query) of the privacy preservation problem into default logic (using the translation trans shown in Definition 6).
Theorem 7 Suppose that A is an atom and that P3(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , A) is a privacy preservation problem and trans(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , A) = ∆ = (D, W ). Then: X is a solution to the above privacy preservation problem iff there is a consistent extension
Proof. We first formulate a useful abstract lemma.
Lemma 8 Let W , LDB and P be consistent sets of formulae s.t. W ∪ LDB is consistent as well. Let
D P = { p : ¬p : p ∈ P } and D LDB = { : f f : f ∈ LDB}.
Then the consistent extensions of the theory (D P ∪ D LDB , W ) are the sets Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F }) where F is a subset of LDB that is maximal wrt. set inclusion (i.e. there is no larger set F such that W ∪ {f : f ∈ F } |= p for all p ∈ P ).
The proof of our main theorem is an application of our lemma. Suppose X is a solution to P3(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , A) and let trans(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , A) = ∆ = (D, W ). Then we let F := X, W := BK(u 0 ) and P := {p : (∃u ∈ U − {u 0 }) p ∈ Priv(u) and BK(u 0 ) |= p} and apply our lemma. The set Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F }) is an extension (it is maximal because of (3) and (2) in the definition of a privacy preserving answer).
Conversely let be given a consistent extension E of trans(LDB, U , BK, Priv, u 0 , A) and consider X := {Aθ | Aθ ∈ E ∩ LDB}. Our lemma implies that X is a subset of LDB that is maximal. Therefore X is also a privacy preserving answer (if there were a larger X satisfying (2) in the definition of pp answer, then E would not be maximal and thus not be an extension). Proof of the lemma. Clearly the sets Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F }) where F is a maximal subset of LDB are extensions of the default theory: the defaults in D P do not apply and we are left with a supernormal default theory (the result follows from well-known characterizations in default logic, see eg. [Dix, 1992, Marek and Truszczyński, 1993] ).
Conversely, let E be a consistent extension. Then no default in D P applies. Because extensions are grounded and we are dealing with a supernormal theory, E must have the form Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F }) for a subset F of LDB. Because E is maximal (no other extension can contain E), the set Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F }) is maximal in the sense defined in the lemma.
The preceding theorem applies to atomic queries. A straightforward extension of the above proof gives us the following theorem which applies to arbitrary queries.
Corollary 1 Suppose that P3(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , Q) is a privacy preservation problem and that trans(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , Q) = ∆ = (D, W ). Then: X is a solution to the above privacy preservation problem iff there is a consistent extension
In order to illustrate this theorem, we revisit the example privacy preservation problem and its default logic translation that we presented earlier. Figure 6 . As seen in Example 4, there are two privacy preserving answers to this problem. They are:
Example 9 Let us return to the MedDB example. Consider the privacy preservation problem of Example 4 and the default logic translation shown in
The default logic translation of this privacy preservation problem shown in Example 6 has exactly four consistent extensions E 1 , . . . , E 4 .
However, if we restrict our interest to answers to the query symptom(john, X) in the above extensions, then extensions E 1 , E 4 only contain {symptom(john, s 1 ), symptom(john, s 2 )} while E 2 , E 3 only contain {symptom(john, s 1 ), symptom(john, s 3 )}. These restrictions of the extensions are in a one-one correspondence with the privacy preserving answers to the query posed by the accountant.
Complexity of Privacy Preservation
In this section, we analyze the complexity of the privacy preservation problem.
Computing a privacy-preserving answer typically involves "guessing" a subset of answers, and subsequently checking it with respect to privacy preservation and maximality. Intuitively, this computational task has a correspondence to common non-monotonic reasoning tasks, because the maximality condition for privacy-preserving answers has its counterpart as minimality conditions in non-monotonic semantics, while guessing a model candidate and checking it on a set of formulae is even more closely related.
It therefore does not come as a surprise that a non-monotonic logic allows for an apt representation of the privacy preservation problem. Concerning the complexity analysis, we can indeed leverage the translation trans to use well-known results concerning the complexity of default logic in order to prove membership of various subclasses of P3.
As already shown in [Reiter, 1980] , default reasoning involving function symbols is undecidable. Note that Definitions 5 and 6 involve checking BK(u 0 ) |= p, which is clearly undecidable for arbitrary first-order formulae. We will therefore focus on decidable fragments. In particular, we will assume in our analyses below that problems are restricted to those for which deciding BK |= p, p ∈ Priv is feasible in polynomial time. We will focus on theories in a Datalog setting, the data complexity of which corresponds to propositional default theories.
Then, membership can be seen by virtue of trans and the shape of formulae in BK and Priv. In particular, brave reasoning for non-disjunctive default theories is NPcomplete (see e.g. [Kautz and Selman, 1991, Stillman, 1990] for such classes), while brave reasoning for arbitrary default theories is Σ P 2 -complete, see [Gottlob, 1992] and [Stillman, 1992] .
We thus consider P3s with the following restrictions:
1. We vary BK(u) to be an arbitrary theory, a non-disjunctive theory, and a set of facts.
2. We vary Priv(u) to be a set of arbitrary formulas, a non-disjunctive theory, and a set of facts. Next, we will prove some of the hardness results.
Corollary 2 P3 with BK containing non-disjunctive rules and Priv made of facts is hard for NP.
Priv/BK
Facts Non-disjunctive Arbitrary Proof. We show NP-hardness by a reduction from 3SAT to a P3 in which BK contains only rules with negation on LDB predicates and in which Priv contains only one fact:
where (¬x) = x and x = ¬x. Finally, Priv(u 1 ) = {unsat}, and Q = q. It is not hard to see that q is an answer iff φ is satisfiable: If q is an answer, then a truth assignment can be obtained from the subset X ⊆ LDB in which exactly the c i in X are interpreted as true. Since unsat does not hold for this X, no conjunct in φ evaluates to false under this assignment, which therefore satisfies φ. Conversely, if φ is satisfiable, each cardinality maximal satisfying truth assignment induces an X ⊆ LDB, such that
Corollary 3 P3 with empty BK and arbitrary Priv is hard for Σ P 2 . Proof. We show Σ P 2 -hardness by a reduction from a QBF 2,∃ to a P3 in which BK is empty and Priv contains arbitrary formulae. Consider ψ = ∃x 1 · · · ∃x n ∀y 1 · · · ∀y m φ, where φ is a propositional formula. We create a P3 with LDB = {x 1 , . . . , x n } ∪ {q}, two users u 0 , u 1 , Priv(u 1 ) = {¬E}, and Q = q. An answer X induces a valuation ν of the existentially quantified variables. Then, no extension ν of ν to the universally quantified variables can exist such that E is false, hence ψ is valid. Conversely, if ψ is valid, each cardinality maximal satisfying truth assignment for x 1 , . . . , x n induces an answer.
This proof can easily be adapted such that BK(u 0 ) contains the arbitrary formula (¬E) → unsat and Priv(u 1 ) contains only unsat.
All complexity results above refer to propositional theories or data complexity, in our setting this means that only LDB is considered as input, while especially BK and Priv are considered to be fixed. For considering program complexity, we can adapt the data complexity results by using techniques from [Gottlob et al., 1999] . Due to space constraints, we do not present proofs.
Theorem 11 The program complexity for P3 problems without function symbols under various syntactic restrictions are as reported in the table below.
Priv/BK Facts Non-disj. Arbitrary Facts EXPTIME EXPTIME NEXPTIME NP Non-disj. NEXPTIME NEXPTIME NEXPTIME
NP
Arbitrary NEXPTIME NP NEXPTIME NP NEXPTIME
To summarize, the results in this section confirm that default logic is indeed a suitable choice to represent P3s.
Privacy Preservation Algorithm
In this section, we describe an algorithm to preserve privacy that leverages our translation of the privacy preservation problem to default logic. First and foremost, we recall the important observation of [Baral and Subrahmanian, 1993 ] that Reiter's Γ ∆ operator is anti-monotonic -hence, the operator Γ 2 ∆ that applies Γ ∆ is monotonic. As a consequence, Γ 2 ∆ has both a least fixpoint and a greatest fixpoint, denoted lfp(Γ Theorem 12 ( [Baral and Subrahmanian, 1993] ) Recall the following properties:
Γ

∆ has a least and a greatest fixpoint, denoted respectively as lfp(Γ
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is that one can compute extensions of default theories by first computing lfp(Γ is not an extension, we nondeterministically add things in gfp(Γ 2 ∆ ) to the default theory and iteratively compute the least fixpoint of Γ 2 ∆ w.r.t. the modified theory. This algorithm for arbitrary default theories gives rise to the following specialization for computing privacy preserving answers.
The algorithm proceeds as follows: First the problem is translated to a default theory using trans. Subsequently, the least and greatest fixpoint of Γ 2 ∆ are computed. Anything which is in the greatest, but not in the least fixpoint can or cannot be true in some extension, so we store it in T odo to nondeterministically assume its truth.
The crucial point here is that we restrict these nondeterministic choices to LDB, which can dramatically decrease the search space. Then we enter the nondeterministic phase of the algorithm, in which a truth assignment for T odo is generated until a fixpoint (i.e., an extension) is reached, if at all. As a final step, a projection of the extension onto LDBis generated.
The following theorem states that the above algorithm is always guaranteed to return the correct answer.
Theorem 13 Consider a privacy preservation problem P3(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , Q).
Then the algorithm P3Alg(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , Q) returns X iff X is a privacy preserving answer to P3(LDB, U, BK, Priv, u 0 , Q).
We have thus given an effective and also efficient (w.r.t. to general algorithms computing answers to default theories) algorithm for computing privacy preserving answers.
Related Work and Conclusions
Security and privacy of information are closely related. There has been extensive work on privacy and security for many years now [M. Winslett and Qian, 1994 , P. Bonatti and Subrahmanian, 1995 , Cuppens and Demolombe, 1997 , Samarati and Sweeney, 1998 ]. A body of work in the field [M. Winslett and Qian, 1994, P. Bonatti and Subrahmanian, 1995] set up the security problem as that of inferring a maximal subset of the answer to a query so that no secrets are violated. Algorithms were also given to determine how to update the database so that security and privacy are preserved. Another body of work [Samarati and Sweeney, 1998 ] determines how to generalize answers (rather than choose a subset). Our work is related to the former category.
In contrast to the above body of work, we are aware of no works that ties well known nonmonotonic logic formalisms such as default logic to the privacy preservation problem. This paper is a first step in this regard. As shown by the P3Alg algorithm and the complexity results derived in this paper, the relationships between privacy preservation and default logics can lead to results in one domain being applicable and beneficial to another. Our future work will focus on leveraging the relationship between default logic and privacy even further so that the rich experience gained in implementing default logics can be applied fruitfully to the privacy domain.
